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EMPLOYMENT TESTING AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
AGENCY GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION
PROCEDURES: ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS
BACKWARD FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY.
Standardized employment tests1 play a vital role in the modern employee
selection process. Employers use the results of these testing devices, which
purport to measure ability, aptitude, or achievement, to make decisions about
hiring, promotion, transfer, and placement. Approximating the number of
tests currently administered would be difficult, but it is safe to say that em-
ployment tests are pervasive in the American public and private job sectors.
2
Given the obvious importance of these tests to job applicants, it is cause for
alarm that black and other minority group applicants consistently score lower
as a class on standardized tests than do white, culturally mainstream test-
takers.3  The lower test scores, in turn, have resulted in lower selection rates
for minority job applicants. Reasons for the disproportionate racial impact
4
1. "Any paper-and-pencil measure . . . used as a basis for any employment deci-
sion" that is a "formal, scored, quantified or standardized technique of assessing job suit-
ability .... ." Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1976). It should be noted that employee
selection procedures include techniques other than the standardized test to which this
note is addressed.
2. See D. GOSLIN, THE SEARCH FOR ABILITY 54 (1963); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
3. See generally J. KIRKPATRICK, R. EWEN, R. BARRETr, R. KATZELL, TESTING
AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT (1968); Adler, Intelligence Testing of the Culturally Disad-
vantaged: Some Pitfalls, 37 J. NEGRO ED. 364 (1968); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and
Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1638-41 (1969). See also Davis v.
Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (fail-
ure rate for blacks was 57%; for whites, 13%); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (black examinees failed at rate of 49%; whites
failed at rate of 15%); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
1333, 1335 (2d Cir. 1973) (passing rate for whites was 58%; for blacks and Puerto
Ricans, 17%); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1972)
(passing rate for whites was one and one-half times that for blacks and Puerto Ricans);
NAACP v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (white pass rate
was 45% as compared to 4%, 15% and 32% respectively for blacks, Latinos and
Asians).
4. The disparate effects of standardized employment tests on minority groups will
be discussed in terms of racial impact on black test-takers. The reader should be aware,
however, that the tests have a disparate impact on minorities generally.
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of testing devices are uncertain. It is generally accepted, however, that the
failure of blacks to master standardized testing techniques is largely a result
of the cumulative, debilitating effects of past and present segregation, institu-
tional racism, cultural separatism, and lesser educational and cultural oppor-
tunities. 5 Because of this disparate racial impact and its traceable roots,
many testing devices have been the targets of laws promoting fair employ-
ment.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 was enacted as a concerted,
comprehensive attempt to eliminate "all aspects of discrimination" 7 in the
employment arena. 8 Initially predicated on the assumption that employment
discrimination was the result of isolated instances of organizational or individ-
ual ill will,9 Title VII nonetheless was aimed at a wholesale dismantling of
systems which effectively excluded minority groups.' 0 Although Title VII
5. It is generally recognized that standardized ability, achievement, and aptitude
tests measure the accumulation of acquired knowledge in an attempt to predict future
ability. See Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 481 (D.D.C. 1967), a] 'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). "[Clrucial factors in a person's
score are the quality and extent of his past schooling and training and the degree ot
correlation between his cultural milieu and that which serves as the test's point ot refer-
ence." Cooper & Sobol, supra note 3, at 1639.
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § VII, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975). Title VII applies to employers engaged in interstate
commerce who have more than 25 employers, employment agencies, labor organizations
engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce, joint labor-management organiza-
tions, and state, local and federal governments.
7. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire any individual
• ..because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...."
9. SENATE COMM. ON LAYOR AND PUB. WELFARE, S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1971).
10. See Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314, 321 (E.D. La. 1970)
(overall legislative purpose of Title VII is elimination of all unjustified impediments to
realization of full equal employment opportunity for blacks). See also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971):
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, pro-
cedures or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent can-
not be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimina-
tory employment practices [or operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of racial or other impermissible classifications].
Id. at 429-31 (emphasis added). It should noted that Title VII eliminates the need for
proof of discriminatory intent in establishing illegally discriminatory testing devices.
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would arguably prohibit the use of testing devices that operate to exclude
proportionately more blacks than whites as "failure . . .to hire" because of
race," the Act explicitly authorizes the use of "professionally developed
ability tests" in employment decisions.12  To the extent that the tests are
"professionally developed" and are not designed, used or intended to dis-
criminate, it would appear that Title VII on its face allows the use of tests
with disproportionate racial impact.' 3 The Civil Rights Act left the practical
interpretation of the Title VII testing standards to the courts and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was created by Con-
gress to administer and enforce the Act. 14 In 19701 EEOC published its
"Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures"' 6 which superseded and en-
larged upon some earlier, sketchy testing guidelines. 17 The EEOC guidelines
are an extremely stringent interpetation of the testing provisions of Title VII
and impose rigorous standards on test users.
The EEOC guidelines were adopted with several modifications from testing
guidelines developed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
11. See note 8 supra.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the results
of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its admin-
istration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to dis-
criminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin ...
13. What Congress intended in its Title VII testing provisions has been the subject
of much academic dispute. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 66-75
(1972); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on lob
Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 852-58
(1972).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 5, 12(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The EEOC is charged
with administering and enforcing Title VII as to all employers subject to the Title
with the exception of the federal government. Id. See note 6 supra. The EEOC
has the authority to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry
out the provisions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (Supp. V 1975). These
regulations are rules of procedure and administrative interpretations, bounded by the
standards and limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970),
and cannot be substantive rules or quasi-legislative proclamations. See Blumrosen, supra
note 13, at 95 & n.143.
15. Prior to 1970, the EEOC carried out its implementation of Title VII responsi-
bilities by encouraging voluntary modification of discriminatory tests, rendering admin-
istrative decisions on claims of discriminatory tests, and giving technical and remedial
assistance. See generally Cooper & Sobol, supra note 3, at 1656-59.
16. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EEOC guidelines]. These
guidelines apply to tests as well as to all employment selection procedures. 29 C.F.R.
at § 1607.2.
17. 32 Fed. Reg. 7982 (1967).
[Vol. 26:852
Employment Testing
(OFCCP) of the Department of Labor. The OFCCP guidelines,", published
in 1971, were interpretations of Executive Order 11246 of 1965,19 a doc-
ument as important to fair employment law as Title VII. The Order pro-
vides that all government contractors having contracts above a specific dollar
amount must agree, as a term of their contracts, to use affirmative action
to secure the employment and advancement of minority group members.
Like the EEOC and the OFCCP, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has
important administrative and interpretative responsibilities in the enforce-
ment of fair employment policy. Executive Order 11478 directs federal de-
partments and agencies to maintain affirmative action programs that promote
equal employment opportunity in all civilian employment in the federal gov-
ernment. 20  The CSC, charged with implementing these equal opportunity
responsibilities, 21 issued its general regulations on employment practices, in-
cluding testing, in 1971.22 With the enactment of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1972,23 the CSC was given the authority to enforce the
statute's prohibition against discrimination in the federal government. In
1972, the Commission issued instructions supplementing its general 1971
regulations on "Examining, Testing, Standards, and Employment Practices."
These instructions are much less stringent and rigorous than the guidelines
of the EEOC and the OFCCP.
24
18. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.1-.18 (1976).
19. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Exec. Order No. 11,375) (1967), 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985
(Exec. Order, No. 11,478) (1969). The OFCCP guidelines are intended to impose the
same standards as the EEOC guidelines. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.1(c) n.1. Executive Order
11,246 designates the Secretary of Labor as the official responsible for the implementation
of all facets of equal employment opportunity in the federal procurement area. These
responsibilities have been delegated to and are administered by the Director of the
OFCCP. The OFCCP guidelines on "Employee Testing and Other Selection Procedures"
implement the fair employment responsibilities so delegated.
20. 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969), amending Exec. Order No. 11,246; as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,590, 36 Fed. Reg. 7831 (1971).
21. Executive Order No. 11478 gives CSC the power to issue regulations and orders,
and instructions to carry out its provisions. The Commission responded with general
guidelines.
22. 5 C.F.R. H9 300.101-.104 (1976).
23. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-15 (1970).
The 1972 Act extended the provisions of Title VII to federal, state, and local govern-
mental entities and increased the enforcement powers of the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-5, 16 (Supp. V 1975). The Act gives the CSC the power to issue rules, regu-
lations, orders, and instructions to carry the enforcement of Title VII against the federal
government. Id. § 2000e-16(b).
24. 37 Fed. Reg. 21,552 (1972). These instructions, as well as the 1971 regulations,
1977]
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Thus, with respect to testing devices which produce a disparate racial im-
pact, two sets of guidelines-those of the EEOC/OFCCP and the CSC-
were in existence through 1976. Both sets of guidelines were criticized by
courts and commentators 25 because of their content and the differing and
unequal standards they imposed. Early in 1973, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Coordinating Council (EEOCC) ,26 charged by Title VII with elimi-
nating inconsistency among the operations of the agencies and departments
responsible for enforcement of federal equal employment opportunity law,
27
began work on "proposed uniform guidelines" for employee selection pro-
cedures. 28  Several drafts were prepared over a three-year period with a re-
vised draft published for comment on July 14, 1976.29 The EEOC dissented
from this published draft,30 thereby aborting the proposed issuance of uni-
form guidelines. The OFCCP and the CSC, however, scuttled their respec-
tive selection and testing guidelines and endorsed the proposed guidelines.
Together with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the OFCCP and the CSC,
were issued under the authority and as interpretations of non-Title VII fair employment
law. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 259 n.4 (1976).
25. Generally, the EEOC guidelines have been criticized by commentators as being
unworkable, overly strict, and dated. While courts have usually endorsed the idea of
proving job-relatedness of suspect tests and have given great deference to the EEOC
guidelines in principle, the majority of them have refused to require strict compliance
with the EEOC guidelines in Title VII actions. At the same time, the CSC guidelines
have been criticized as being lax and vague. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d
976, 990 n.109 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (CSC guidelines vague); Henderson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 360 F. Supp. 531, 545 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (no test exists that can comply with the
EEOC guidelines); Johnson, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs
and the Death of Employment Testing, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1239-40, 1256-62 (1976)
(EEOC guidelines unrealistic); Comment, Developments in the Law-Employment Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1128-
32 (1971) (EEOC guidelines overly strict).
26. The Council is composed of the Departments of Labor and Justice, the EEOC,
the CSC, and the Civil Rights Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (Supp. V 1975).
27. Id.
28. Reasons for EEOCC initiation of the search for new guidelines apparently in-
cluded the obvious need for consistency in federal guidelines, significant criticism of
existing guidelines, issuance of updated industrial psychological studies on testing in
1974 and 1975. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39, 246-48, 263-70 (1976)
(recent Supreme Court decision in which six members of the Court attacked EEOC prin-
ciples and technical standards). See also note 44, infra.
29. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,016 (1976).
30. The EEOC stated that the proposed guidelines did not represent the view of
that agency. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734 (1976). Concurrence of the Civil Rights Commis-
sion was not solicited by the EEOC "because one of [its] roles . .. is to analyze
critically the efforts of Federal agencies in the enforcement of civil rights law." 41
Fed. Reg. 29,016 (1976).
[Vol. 26:852
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on November 23, 1976, adopted the new "federal executive agency guide-
lines on employee selection procedures" as their respective guidelines.
31
Henceforth, these DOJ guidelines will be applied to all government contrac-
tors subject to Executive Order No. 11246, to the federal government as em-
ployer, and by the Department of Justice exercising its responsibilities under
federal law.32 State and local governments and other public and private em-
ployers subject to Title VII will remain bound by the EEOC guidelines.
3 3
The DOJ guidelines mark a break with previous fair employment law on
the use of standardized testing devices having disproportionate racial impact.
The change, manifested in the testing standards and requirements themselves,
is a significant one in terms of equal employment opportunity policy and
31. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734, 51,735, 51,744, 51,752 (1976). On November 24, 1976,
the day after the three agencies published their new guidelines, the EEOC republished
its guidelines of 1970. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,984 (1976).
32. The DOJ guidelines would be utilized by the Department of Justice primarily
in three instances involving employee selection devices and tests. The first situation
would arise when employment tests having disparate racial impact are administered un-
der any program or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available
to states and instrumentalities by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) under the Omnibus Crime Control and -Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-35, 82 Stat. 197 (1968), as amended, Pub. L. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197, Pub. L. No. 93-415,
88 Stat. 1142, codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3795 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Under 42
U.S.C. § 3766(c) (Supp. V 1975), the LEAA and the Attorney General, as enforcement
arms of the Department of Justice, would use the DOJ guidelines as a standard of
legality in civil actions brought against states engaging in patterns and practices of
discrimination by way of discriminatory testing devices. Secondly, under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, codified, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970), the Department of Justice would use the DOJ guidelines, again as standards
for determining the legality of discriminatory testing devices, in civil actions brought
against persons or governmental entities administering any federally financed program
or activity that utilized racially discriminatory employment tests. Lastly, application
of the DOJ guidelines by the Department of Justice may arise in enforcing Title VII
itself. By provision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, 86 Stat. 107, codified, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)-6(e) (Supp. V 1975), the initial
Title VII enforcement authority of the Attorney General granted by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was transferred to the EEOC effective for two years after March 24,
1972. Hence, application of the DOJ guidelines to suspect testing devices may well
be the legal standard governing cases instituted by the Attorney General prior to March
24, 1974, and pending adoption of the DOJ guidelines by the Department of Justice.
Whether the DOJ guidelines or those of the EEOC will be applied by the courts in
such cases is a question subject to judicial discretion. See notes 33 and 116 infra.
33. But see United States v. Jefferson County, No. 75-P-0666-S (N.D. Ala., Jan. 10,
1977) where, in a Title VII action involving challenges to the testing practices, inter
alia, of a state governmental agency, the court freely used the DOJ guidelines while
noting conflicts between them and those of the EEOC. Id. at 10 n.12. The Jefferson
County case is an example of the type of case instituted by the Attorney General
prior to the effective date of transfer of Title VII enforcement authority to the EEOC
and pending at the time the DOJ guidelines were adopted. See note 32 supra.
1977]
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strategy. This note will assess the elements and the impact of this change
in fair employment law with reference to the competing interests involved
in the use of standardized employment tests.
I. EMPLOYMENT TESTING: COMPETING INTERESTS AND THEIR
RECONCILIATION
Employment testing has decided advantages for both the employer/test-
user and the job applicant. For the employer, the use of tests as a means
of selecting applicants provides a quick, efficient, and reliable device for
identifying those qualified for a job in terms of aptitude, achievement, intel-
ligence, or skills. For the applicant, tests are an impartial means of selection,
shielding the test-taker from the subjective whims and biases of employers.
Furthermore, tests provide greater quantitative precision in measuring skills
and aptitude than do job interviews or resume scans.3 4  These advantages,
however, must be measured against the disproportionate racial impact of test-
ing devices, particularly as seen in tests which purport to measure an individ-
ual's general level of aptitude or intelligence.
The disparate and adverse racial impact of testing devices is the end prod-
uct of numerous, complex factors.3 5 Ability tests such as intelligence, apti-
tude, or achievement tests are generally recognized as measurements of the
quality and extent of a test taker's cultural milieu, past learning experience
and social and intellectual challenges, and psychological make-up. 36 In the
case of black minority group members, this personal background is often
dominated by educational segregation,3 ¢ societal racism, 38 and cultural sepa-
34. For a general discussion of the benefits of employment testing over other subjec-
tive employment decision procedures, see E. GHISELLI, VALIDITY OF OCCUPATIONAL APTI-
TUDE TESTS 5-6 (1966).
35. Simple lack of intelligence and inferior mental capacity of blacks has long been
discarded on the basis of objective studies and research. See Note, Legal Implications
of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 691, 692-95 (1968).
36. Northcross, The Limits on Employment Testing, 50 J. URBAN L. 349, 351-53
(1973); Wesman, Intelligent Testing, 23 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 267, 269 (1968); Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 478-85 (D.D.C. 1967).
37. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (because they are
blacks, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools). See also
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test for voter registration
barred, because, as a result of the inferior education of blacks, the right to vote would
be indirectly abridged on account of race); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954) (segregation sanctioned by law tends to retard the educational and mental devel-
opment of black children and to deprive them of some benefits of a racially integrated
school system).
38. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 480-85 (D.D.C. 1967) (segregation
[Vol. 26:852
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ratism. 39 As a result, standardized testing devices given to blacks reflect
either the debilitating effects of segregation and racism or the difference be-
tween black experience and white mainstream culture. In either case, stand-
ardized tests do not ordinarily measure the natural ability, intelligence,
achievements, or job suitability of black individuals.
40
Testing devices, then, are deemed necessary for business purposes and ad-
vantageous for the job applicant. Yet, at the same time, they operate to ex-
clude proportionately more blacks than whites from available jobs. These
competing interests of equal employment opportunity and general test useful-
ness had to be reconciled by Congress in drafting Title VII. Tests with dis-
parate racial impact are now illegally discriminatory under Title VII unless
"professionally developed" and not designed, intended, or used for dis-
criminatory purposes. 41 It is the general consensus among legal commenta-
tors and the courts that Congress intended to make illegal those tests with
adverse racial impact that were not job-related; that is, tests that did not re-
liably measure the test-taker's ability for the job in question. 42 Thus, recon-
ciliation of the competing interests surrounding the use of testing devices re-
sulted in congressional legitimation of tests that were job-related, regardless
of racial impact.
43
in society has led to language barriers, to lack of self-confidence, and to a sense of
racial inferiority and apathy on the part of blacks, resulting in handicaps to learning
and thus comparatively poor test performance). See also J. CONANT, SLUMS AND
SUBURBS 13 (1961); D. GOSLIN, THE SEARCH FOR ABILITY (1963); T. PETIGREW, A
PROFILE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN 100-35 (1964).
39. Segregation has prompted cultural separatism resulting in a black subculture char-
acterized by, among other aspects, different language and conceptual patterns. See
Northcross, supra note 36, at 349, 352 and authorities cited at note 38 supra. When
a test is constructed by the majority white culture with its own idioms and concepts
or is constructed to be valid for the majority, the result is poor performance by members
of the subcultures. Id. Some have suggested that the tests themselves are not racially
biased but that the jobs and institutions for which the tests are utilized have been
defined and molded in a discriminatory fashion over years of white domination, resulting
in jobs that are exclusively and discriminatorily defined. See, e.g., Joyce, The American
Tragedy, Act IV; Soc. PROGRESS 5 (May-June, 1968).
40. This principle is true as long as the adverse effects of past and present racial
segregation and discrimination on the black minority continue, presuming that tests
constructed with the idiom and concepts of mainstream culture are jettisoned. Just when
the adverse effects that hamper black test performance will cease is uncertain and may
largely depend on the success of equal employment opportunity law and affirmative
action programs. See Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 102-07.
41. See notes 8 & 12 and accompanying text supra.
42. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 431 (1971); Blumrosen,
supra note 13, at 81-83. But see Wilson, supra note 13, at 852-58 (Congress accepted
the notion that general intelligence or aptitude tests were nearly always job-related with-
out need for separate validation).
43. Likewise, the courts have reconciled the conflict between the benefits of stand-
19771
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By establishing the illegality of tests having disproportionate racial impact
unless manifestly job-related and professionally developed, Congress and the
courts drew professional psychology into the field of fair employment law.
In response to increasing employer needs for tests that accurately measure
the job suitability of job applicants, industrial psychologists have devised
methods for developing job-related tests and for upgrading the job-related-
ness of existing tests.44 Equal employment opportunity law has come to rely
on these methods of establishing job-relatedness in determining the legality
of tests with adverse racial impact. The genuine capacity of a test to
measure actual job suitability is established by professional psychological an-
alysis of both the test itself and its construction and development. This pro-
cess entails job analysis, analysis of test content, test validation, and doc-
umentation of the study and its processes. Job analysis involves examination
of the job in question to ascertain the level of skills and work behaviors neces-
sary for adequate job performance. 45" Next, the test content is studied to
determine what ability, skills, and behaviors the test is attempting to measure.
Third, there is a validation of the test, which, in essence, is a professional de-
ardized testing devices and equal employment opportunity by nearly universally requiring
that tests with disproportionate racial impact be shown to be job-related under penalty
of a finding of illegal racial discrimination. "The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. . . . More than that, Congress
has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must
have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48
(1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973). Similarly, tests with adverse
racial impact have been deemed illegally discriminatory unless job-related in non-Title
VII actions. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (42 U.S.C. §
2000(e) et seq. (1970) and fifth amendment); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33
(1st Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970)); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970) and fourteenth
amendment). But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-46 & n.12 (1976),
wherein the Supreme Court disapproved of imposing job-relatedness requirements un-
der non-Title VII actions unless proof of discriminatory racial purpose in the use of
the employment practice in question has been shown.
44. See, e.g., Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures
of the American Psychological Association (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 A.P.A.
Standards]; Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests of the American Psycho-
logical Association (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 A.P.A. Standards]. This collection
of principles and standards represents the most prominent and widely accepted of the
psychological models for use of standardized ability tests.
45. E. GHISELLI, supra note 34, at 22-23 (1966). See also Wilson, supra note 13,
at 859-60. Job analysis entails the isolation of the qualities necessary for adequate
job performance and the determination of their relative importance and the level of
competence required as to each of them.
[Vol. 26:852
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termination of whether a test actually and reliably measures what has been
defined as adequate job performance. A test is valid and job-related if it
measures the person against important elements of the job necessary for suc-
cessful job performance. Test validation is accomplished by one of three
methods, occasionally used in combination: criterion-related validation, con-
tent validation, and construct validation.
Criterion-related validation is a process by which actual test performance
or success and actual job performance or success are directly compared. This
comparison of performances is made by means of statistical and empirical
evaluation of the relationship between test scores and those external elements
or criteria of the job in question established by job analysis as measures of
successful job performance.46 The relationship may be established pre-
dictively, concurrently, or synthetically47 and must have practical and stat-
istical significance. 48  Criterion-related test validation, though burden-
some, 49 is the most reliable method of test validation because by virtue of
its empirical nature, it clearly demonstrates the job-relatedness of a test.6 °
46. Such elements or criteria are derived from thorough and documented analysis
of the elements of adequate job performance and include work proficiency data, work
behaviors, supervisory ratings, and regularity of attendance at work. Thus, criteria for
an assembly line worker might include output, number of mistakes and the like.
47. Predictive and concurrent criterion-related validation are processes by which a
test-user attempts validation of the test in question within the confines of his own
place of employment. Each method entails use of test control groups whose job per-
formance is compared with their test scores, whether tests are given prior to hiring
(predictive) or afterwards (concurrent), to determine if a valid relationship exists be-
tween performance and scores. Synthetic validation involves the use of and reliance
on validation studies done elsewhere than in the user's place of employment but in
similar job situations. This method has been criticized in that job performance in appar-
ently similar job situations may involve subtle but significant differences. For a general
discussion of these methods of criterion-validated studies, see Comment, supra note 25,
at 1121-23; Vulcan Soc., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. Practical significance is established by showing a relationship between test scores
and job performance large enough to be practically significant as a measure. Statistical
significance is a mathematical demonstration of the accuracy of the test as predictor
of successful job performance, i.e., a demonstration that the relationship between test
scores and job criteria is high enough to have a probability of no more than 1 to
20 that it occurred by chance. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 860-61.
49. Criteria necessary for adequate job performance are often difficult to isolate and
quantify, much less evaluate, in terms of importance. Often criteria are grouped to-
gether generally to construct "indices of job performance." Note, Application of the
EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Pub-
lic and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 503, 518 (1973). Predictive and con-
current methods of criteria-related validation are burdensome for the employer, as is
the necessity for demonstrating practical and statistical significance. See generally Wil-
son, supra note 13, at 860-63.
50. The 1966 A.P.A. Standards, supra note 44, gave professional preference to the
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Content validation, or rational validation, is a subjective analysis and com-
parison of the actual content of a test with the actual and specific skills and
knowledge which have been determined by job analysis to be necessary for
successful job performance. 5' If a test closely duplicates specific job duties,
it is considered to have high content validity. Content validation, because
of its provision for subjective comparison of test content with job content, has
often been called "expert advice" validation.52  Finally, construct validation,
another form of rational validation,53 seeks to evaluate the degree to which
a test reliably measures whether a test-taker possesses some hypothetical gen-
eral and psychological trait or construct shown by job analysis to be neces-
sary for successful job performance. 4 The construct or trait must have mani-
fest predictive value with respect to future job performance, and actual com-
parison of job performance with test performance is necessary to determine
the relationship of the hypothetical trait to a particular job.55
If the necessary relationship between test performance or content and job
performance is verified by criterion-related, content, or construct validation
studies, then the test has been shown to be job-related under current stand-
ards of professional psychology. 0 But tests that have been shown to be gen-
use of criterion-related validation over content and construct validation procedures. See
also Comment, supra note 25, at 1121-23; Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337-38 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. Content validation is deemed the most appropriate method for tests which meas-
ure achievement and other present skills and knowledge, as distinct from those tests
which predict future performance and are best validated by criterion-related validation
methods. For example, typing, stenography, and spelling tests have high content valid-
ity for secretarial positions but low, if any, content or criterion-related validity for
management positions. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 863; Note, supra note 49, at
517.
52. Content validation is highly dependent on opinions of psychologists and is there-
fore rational rather than empirical. Further, content validation is an attempt to discern
a rational relationship between content of the test and job content. Id. It should
be noted that content validity requires a factually based linkage of the testing device
to job duties.
53. Construct validation is also highly dependent on opinions and rational relation-
ships as determined by psychological analysis. See note 52 supra. It does, however,
require empirical research data linking the testing device to the job construct or trait
being measured.
54. Typical construct-validated tests are the general intelligence types of devices on
which blacks and other minority group persons fare poorly. See notes 35-40 & accom-
panying text supra. A construct-validated test for typists would measure ability to con-
centrate, perseverance, and attention to detail if these traits or constructs are shown
to be necessary for adequate job performance. See Vulcan Soc. Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 395 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. See Note, supra note 49, at 518.
56. In contrast to the 1966 A.P.A. standards, see notes 44 & 50 supra, the 1974
and 1975 A.P.A. standards, supra note 44, are decidedly more relaxed in terms of setting
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erally job-related may be differentially valid; that is, valid for one race or
subculture taking the test, but not for another, and thus underpredictive or
overpredictive of job success for a particular race or culture. 57 Differential
validity, when established,58 indicates that lower black test scores are not re-
flective of lesser job ability or lesser probability of job success.5 9 Tests that
are job-related for white test-takers may well be either nonpredictive or
underpredictive of job success for blacks, as a result of the debilitating effects
of past segregation that hamper articulation and conceptualization.60 This
phenomenon suggests that, once disproportionate racial impact is shown,
separate empirical validation of tests for blacks as a group is appropriate,
as are compensatory measures when differential validity is found.6 1 Some
commentators, however, argue that overall test validity and job-relatedness
suffice to legitimize tests in an imperfect world and in the name of business
necessity and practicality. 62  One thing is clear: a differentially valid test
which excludes disproportionately more blacks than whites from available
jobs on bases other than job suitability represents a significant impediment
to the goal of truly equal employment opportunity.
Proper test validation studies indicate job-relatedness, and tests so vali-
preferences as to any one means of validation. Under the new A.P.A. standards, any
means of validation is proper if appropriate and feasible. One commentator/psycholo-
gist has suggested that the new A.P.A. standards reflect an orientation "toward the
practical and social problems that have been intertwined with the uses of psychological
tests" whereas the old A.P.A. standards were efforts "to develop ethical standards among
its professional members in developing, publishing and using tests with discriminatory
racial impact." Hunt, Civil Service Testing and Affirmative Action: A Psychologist's
Perspective, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 690, 693-94 (1975) (emphasis added).
57. See generally, KIRKPATRICK, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT 30-33 (1968); Wil-
son, supra note 13, at 869-72; Comment, supra note 25, at 1129; Note, supra note
35, at 704-06.
58. Differential validity can only be established empirically, by means of a separate
statistical validation study showing disparate effect and the relationship between test
scores and job performance. See Note, supra note 49, at 520.
59. Wilson, supra note 13, at 871-72; Note, supra note 35, at 704. The concept
of differential validity and the means by which it is established have come under in-
creasing attack as theoretically and empirically unsound and practically infeasible. The
basis of the attacks on differential validity is that if tests are shown to be job-related
by means of proper validation studies, they are job-related for all groups, and if certain
groups register consistently poorer performance as a class it is due to job requirements
rather than test invalidity. See generally United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d
906, 914 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1973); Boehm, Negro-White Differences in Validity of Em-
ployment and Training Selection Procedures: Summary of Research Evidence, 56 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 33 (1972); Johnson, supra note 25, at 1259 & n.107.
60. See notes 3, 5, 35-40 & accompanying text supra.
61. See authorities cited note 57 supra.
62. See note 59 & accompanying text supra.
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dated are legitimized by Title VII and accepted by the courts despite any
adverse racial impact. The concept of differential validity, however, shows
that tests otherwise valid may be not job-related for racial and cultural minor-
ity groups. The job-relatedness standards for tests as established by psy-
chological methods have been adopted in varying degrees by the EEOC
guidelines63 and the new DOJ guidelines. 64  Analysis of the double set of
guidelines reveals not only technical differences but also a variance in the
reconciliation of the competing interests of business necessity and full and
fair employment opportunity.
II. THE CURRENT TESTING GUIDELINES: To EACH AN INTEREST
The EEOC and DOJ guidelines for employee selection procedures are
based on separate psychological testing standards promulgated by the Amer-
ican Psychological Association.6 5 The variations tend to be policy-related.
In sum, the EEOC guidelines allow only the most strictly proven job-related
tests, while the DOJ guidelines give the employer great flexibility in the areas
of test validation and use.
One major difference between the two sets of guidelines is in the finding
that a test having adverse racial impact is illegally discriminatory. The
EEOC guidelines deem such a test illegally discriminatory unless it is properly
validated and evidences a high degree of utility, 6 and unless the test user
can demonstrate that there are no alternative tests with a less drastic adverse
impact.67 The DOJ guidelines, on the other hand, find a test with adverse
racial impact to be illegally discriminatory when it is not properly validated
and when it does not evidence utility equivalent to that imposed on test users
by the EEOC guidelines. 6a The distinction here lies in the EEOC's insistence
63. The EEOC guidelines, supra note 16, are the EEOC's interpretation of the testing
provisions of Title VII.
64. The DOJ guidelines, entitled "Federal Executive Agency Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures," [hereinafter cited as DOJ Guidelines] issued November
23, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734, are the guidelines of the OFCCP, the Department of
Justice and the CSC, used by those agencies in administering and enforcing Executive
Orders No.'s 11,246, 11,478, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16a (Supp. V, 1975) and other fed-
eral law. See notes 18-32 supra.
65. See note 56 supra.
66. Utility here is defined as practical and statistical significance by both sets of
guidelines. See note 48 supra.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1976).
68. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,736, §§ 3(a), 12(b)(5), 12(c)(4) (1976). An additional vari-
ance in the two sets of guidelines is found in different definitions of when a test regis-
ters adverse racial impact. A finding of adverse impact triggers required compliance
with both sets of guidelines and thus its definition is vital. The DOJ guidelines, supra
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that those using a test demonstrate the nonexistence of alternative testing de-
vices with lesser impact in order to escape illegality. 69
A second important difference in the guidelines lies in methods of test vali-
dation studies required to demonstrate job-relatedness, 70 once adverse racial
impact is shown. EEOC mandates that test validation be accomplished by
criterion-related validation studies 71 unless this method is demonstrated by
the test user to be technically infeasible 72 or unless content validity is clearly
appropriate. 73  The guidelines contemplate that content validation will be
deemed appropriate only if the tests are "well-developed" and consist of
"suitable samples of the essential knowledge, skills or behaviors composing
the job in question," as in the case of typing tests and other similar mech-
anical ability tests.7 4  The DOJ guidelines, however, allow the test user to
employ any one of the three current methods of test validation-criterion-re-
lated, content, or construct-whenever it is considered appropriate. 75  Con-
note 64, § 4(b), define adverse impact as a "selection rate for any racial, ethnic or sex
group which is less than four-fifths (4) (or 80 percent) of the rate for the group with
the highest rate." Smaller differences in selection rates, however, may be deemed to
have adverse impact if they are practically and statistically significant. The EEOC
guidelines give no definition of adverse racial impact. EEOC Guidelines supra note 16,
§ 1607.3. The courts have broadly interpreted adverse racial impact and thus have ac-
corded great flexibility in triggering application of Title VII and EEOC guidelines. See,
e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975).
69. The Supreme Court, at least indirectly, endorsed this EEOC requirement in a
Title VII action in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). But
many commentators consider this requirement beyond the intent of Title VII. See,
e.g., Johnson, supra note 25, at 260-61. The DOJ guidelines suggest only that an
employer should use reasonable care to seek out alternative testing devices but do not
require a demonstration of their nonexistence. See Questions and Answers on the Fed-
eral Executive Agency Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 1 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 4905, Q. 36 (Department of Justice, Jan. 19, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 Questions & Answers].
70. These methods are criterion-related, content, and construct validation. See notes
45-56 & accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 46-50 & accompanying text supra.
72. Technical infeasibility is defined as the absence of a sufficient number of minor-
ity persons in either present work force or control sample necessary to demonstrate
that test scores are significantly related with job elements. Without an adequate number
of minority group persons, it would be extremely difficult to demonstrate reliability
or practical/statistical significance of minority test performance as compared to other
group scores. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.4(b).
73. See note 51 supra.
74. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.5(a). Content validation is not con-
sidered appropriate for tests measuring job skills expected to be learned on the job. Id.
75. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, §§ 5, 12(c)(1). Additionally, the DOJ guide-
lines detail proper use and documentation of standards for construct and content valid-
ity to a much greater degree than do the EEOC guidelines. Compare EEOC Guide-
lines, supra note 16, § 1607.5 with DOJ Guidelines §§ 12, 13.
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tent validation is not considered appropriate under the DOJ guidelines for
"intelligence, aptitude, personality or interest tests" or for tests measuring job
skills expected to be learned on the job. 76 The effect of this difference in
approved validation techniques cannot be clearly discerned until actual test-
ing devices are subjected to litigation. But the policy difference is clear: the
EEOC guidelines will deem a test illegally discriminatory unless criterion-re-
lated validation, the most reliable and most burdensome, 77 is either estab-
lished or proven infeasible, whereas the DOJ guidelines will countenance any
method if appropriate. Thus, under the DOJ guidelines, the burden of prov-
ing infeasibility of criterion-related validation is lifted from the employer.
The DOJ guidelines also differ significantly from those of the EEOC with
respect to synthetic validation; that is, the use of validation studies conducted
for job situations other than the actual test user's own. 78 The DOJ guide-
lines, as a matter of express policy, encourage and facilitate cooperative vali-
dation studies in place of internal validation by employers, without any prior-
ity given to individual internal test validation by employers in their own
job situations.79 The EEOC guidelines, on the other hand, allow use of out-
side validation studies only when the employer positively shows that an in-
ternal test validation is infeasible.80
Both sets of guidelines allow an employer using a testing device which has
not been fully validated to continue using the test, but only upon a showing
of "substantial evidence of validity" and only where proper validation studies
are in progress.81 The EEOC guidelines contemplate that the employer/test-
user will "alter or suspend" any test cut-off scores lest test-takers be penalized
without proper validation of the test and so that subsequent validity of the
test can be related back.8 2 Where test validation is not technically feasible
or appropriate,8 3 the DOJ guidelines simply advise the test user to use pro-
76. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 12(c)(1).
77. See notes 49-50 & accompanying text supra.
78. See note 47 supra.
79. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 6.
80. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.7. Further, an employer who seeks
to use other test validation studies under the EEOC guidelines must substantiate in
detail job comparability and absence of major contextual differences. Id. Although
bound under the DOJ standards by the requirements of job comparability and lack
of major contextual differences, the employer does not need to make any substantiation
or showing of these similarities. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 6.
81. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.9; DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64,
§ 5(h).
82. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.9.
83. Technical infeasibility and appropriateness are defined substantially the same way




cedures "as job-related as possible" which will "minimize or eliminate adverse
impact. '8 4 Alternatively, the DOJ guidelines allow the employer to utilize
a nonvalidated test upon a showing that, even with its adverse impact, the
test is necessary to business purposes, i.e., to the safety and efficiency of the
business operation. 5 The EEOC guidelines take an entirely different tack.
EEOC standards will find a test with adverse racial impact illegally dis-
criminatory if validation studies are completely infeasible or inappropriate.8 6
If the same employer then resorts to subjective interviews or scored applica-
tion forms, the EEOC guidelines hold the employer to the same standards
applicable to the use of standardized testing devices.
8 7
A final88 difference between the two sets of guidelines falls in the area
of differential validity, when a test is valid as an indicator of successful job
performance for one group, race, or culture but not for another. s9 The
EEOC guidelines set strict requirements and limitations for tests that are dif-
ferentially valid. Initially, in the overall test validation study, the employer
must generate and report all test data and results separately for each minor-
ity and nonminority group and must validate the test for each minority
group. o0 If differential validity is indicated, that is, if lower minority selec-
84. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 3(b).
85. 1977 Questions & Answers, supra note 69, Q. 12.
86. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.3.
87. Id. at § 1607.13.
88. This discussion of differences is by no means all-inclusive. First, in the area of
documentation of the results and methods of validation procedures, the DOJ guidelines
require the submission of more information and details, 24 items of "essential" informa-
tion in all, as well as other revealing data. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 13.
Second, the affirmative action posture and obligations of an employer using an unvali-
dated test with adverse racial impact will be considered in making any decisions initiat-
ing enforcement proceedings under the DOJ guidelines. Id. at § 4(c); 1977 Questions
& Answers, supra note 69, Q. 9. It is ironic that past obligations to remedy the effects
of segregation may excuse the effects of present discrimination in terms of tests with
adverse racial impact, especially when the adverse impact itself is due to the effects
of past segregation. Third, unlike the EEOC guidelines, which require job analyses
for all job criteria necessary to job performance, the DOJ guidelines preclude the need
for analysis of certain "job behavior," including over-all work performance. See note
45 & accompanying text supra. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 12(b)(3); 1977
Questions & Answers, supra note 69, Q. 29. Lastly, the DOJ guidelines, unlike those
of the EEOC, include "properly measured success in job-related training" as a proper
element of successful job performance allowable for testing and selection procedures.
DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 12(b) (3); 1977 Questions & Answers, supra note 69,
Q. 30. This inclusion of the training element as a criterion of successful job performance
is presumably intended to embrace the finding of the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
89. See notes 57-62 & accompanying text supra.
90. Such a report and separate validation study is required only where technically
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tion rates do not reflect lesser job suitability, the EEOC guidelines prohibit
use of the test in groups for which it is not valid. Further, when a test holds
some validity for two groups, but one group scores consistently higher than
another and that higher score is not linked to better job performance, the
EEOC guidelines require that cutoff scores be established in such a manner
as to predict the same probability of job success. a1
The DOJ guidelines do not recognize the concept of differential validity
per se. Instead, they acknowledge the notion that tests might be "unfair"
if some groups receive lower scores than others and if such lower scores do
not reflect lesser job suitability.9 2 When technically feasible, 93 the employer
must keep a record of the test's impact on minority groups.9 4 If impact in-
formation reveals adverse racial impact, the employer "generally should in-
vestigate the possible existence of unfairness for that group if it is technically
feasible to do so . . ."; the greater the adverse impact, the greater the need
to investigate. 95 Investigation of unfairness under the DOJ guidelines entails
analysis of the validity of the test for other groups and of the test's use in
the overall employee selection procedure. When such an investigation re-
veals test unfairness, the employer may either revise or replace the testing
device or revise his use thereof, to "assure compatibility between the prob-
ability of successful job performance and the probability of being selected." '9 6
The lesson here is that, under EEOC guidelines, the employer is required
to conduct separate validity studies for each minority and nonminority group
of test-takers in order to ascertain if the test is differentially valid. If it is,
the test is invalid for the group for which the test is not job-related, and
EEOC mandates forbid use of the test on this group. Under the DOJ guide-
lines, however, no such separate validation study is required for minority
groups, and thus proof of job-relatedness for these groups is more attenuated
feasible; that is, when there is an adequate number of minority test-takers to assure
the practical and statistical significance of the test scores' correlation with job perform-
ance. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 1607.4(a), 1607.5(b) (5).
91. Where differential validity is infeasible and a separate validation study for the
affected minority group has not been made, provisional compliance with EEOC guide-
lines is accomplished by proof of acceptable validation for other groups pending sep-
arate validation for the affected group. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.5(b)
(5). It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975), endorsed the differential validity requirements of the EEOC guide-
lines. id. at 425.
92. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 12(b)(7)(i).
93. Id. at § 14(j); see note 90 supra.
94. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 4.
95. Id. at § 12(b)(7)(ii).




and circumstantial than empirical. Furthermore, unfair tests are not banned
under the DOJ guidelines; rather, the employer is accorded wide leeway,
Consequently, the duty to ascertain the existence of differentially valid or un-
fair tests and the limitations on such tests are more restrictive in EEOC guide-
lines than in similiar DOJ provisions.
From the foregoing discussion of the two existing sets of testing guidelines,
it is clear that the DOJ guidelines impose lesser restrictions on the use of tests
having adverse racial impact than do the EEOC guidelines. Less of a burden
is placed on the employer as measured in terms of documentation of the test
validation processes, use of alternative testing devices, and use of tests that
are differentially valid or unfair. Additionally, the DOJ guidelines allow the
test-user to continue the administration of suspect, nonvalidated tests having
adverse racial impact with far greater leeway and impunity.
From a broader perspective, it is arguable that the DOJ guidelines, in de-
ference to business needs and purposes in seeking a quality work force, put
less emphasis on the equal employment opportunity mandate to eliminate
those employment practices which continue to penalize blacks because of past
segregation, racism, and cultural separatism.9 7 The EEOC guidelines, con-
versely, may be viewed as an attempt to actualize this equal opportunity
mandate to eliminate all "built-in headwinds" frustrating minority job appli-
cants. They may even go further, in terms of policy, in attempting to remedy
the present adverse testing impact attributable to past segregation by estab-
lishing standards so high and so technically demanding that they operate to
preclude use of all but the most valid and expensively developed tests. Thus,
the EEOC guidelines may serve as a mechanism that deliberately discourages
"paper-and-pencil" testing devices in employment decisions because of their
doubtful capacity to measure actual job performance, particularly in the case
of blacks.98 The issuance of the DOJ guidelines, however, marks a new
phase in employment testing.
97. See notes 6-14, 41-43 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of the purposes
of Title VII and its testing provisions.
98. "[W]hat tests measure is not ability; ability can only be determined by on-
the-job performance. Tests measure something that seemingly correlates with ability."
Note, supra note 35, at 704. The EEOC guidelines declare that professionally developed
tests, when used with other sound employee selection tools, are valuable to the employee
selection process. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1607.1(a). Thus it is arguable
that the EEOC guidelines are actually designed to discourage the sole use of tests in
employee selection procedures. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 1261 ("the commission's
validation procedures are . . . theoretical ideals ...standards of perfection."); Com-
ment, supra note 25, at 1131-32 ("The practical application of the Guidelines may re-
flect a goal more educative than coercive: to force an assessment by business of the
usefulness of the tests they use.").
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE DOJ GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW
The DOJ guidelines contain several gains for fair employment law vis-
a-vis standardized employment tests. First, the guidelines, which were fully
adopted by the Civil Service Commission, replace the former testing regu-
lations and instructions of the Commission which were vague and inade-
quate.9 9 Secondly, they articulate more precise and detailed standards and re-
quirements for job analysis, test validation, and documentation thereof than
do the EEOC guidelines and are thus more helpful to test-users seeking to
comply with testing requirements. The DOJ guidelines achieve a degree of
uniformity in federal testing guidelines never before attained among the vari-
ous federal agencies. 100 Thirdly, the new set of guidelines, based on 1974-
75 standards, reflects current psychological views and strategies, whereas the
EEOC guidelines still adhere to 1966 standards.' 0 ' Additionally, the DOJ
guidelines are closely aligned with the position currently taken by the major-
ity of courts and legal commentators concerning test validation, a position
that concomitantly attacks EEOC principles and guidelines. This view holds
that tests with adverse racial impact must be job-related as shown by
reliable and documented test validation procedures that significantly correlate
adequate job performance with test scores or performance. The predominant
view recognizes criterion-related, content, and construct validation studies as
proper techniques for showing job-relatedness-techniques which some con-
sider to vary in their reliability. Further, there is a strong consensus that
the test-user should not be forced to the extreme of foregoing tests or using
subjective selection practices when objections to testing devices are based on
professionally uncertain concepts of differential validity or on the asserted
need to prove the nonexistence of test alternatives having lesser adverse im-
pact. The approach shared by the DOJ guidelines and prevailing legal think-
ing thus gives the employer the prerogative of using reliable and rationally
99. 5 C.F.R. §§ 300.101-.104 (1976); 37 Fed. Reg. 21,552 (1972) (examination in-
structions). For criticisms of the former guidelines of the Civil Service Commission, see
notes 24-25 & accompanying text supra.
100. EEOC dissent from the DOJ guidelines, however, leaves the bulk of those sub-
ject to Title VII and EEOC jurisdiction-all public and private employers other than
the federal government-bound by stricter guidelines.
101. As was discussed earlier, however, these newer psychological standards and
principles reflect more a change of policy and an increased practical orientation than a
change in substantive accuracy and premises. See note 56 supra. The EEOC guidelines
served to weed out many of the most egregiously discriminatory and unvalidated tests




developed and validated testing devices, unconstrained by overly stringent de-
mands for empirical validation.
10 2
The DOJ guidelines represent the salvation of those testing devices, many
of which could not pass muster under the extremely stringent EEOC guide-
lines.' 03 It is conceivable that the issuance of the DOJ guidelines will en-
courage an increase in the use of testing devices since the guidelines facilitate
the testing validation requirement and generally offer more relaxed and pos-
sibly more realistic standards. Increased use of neutral testing devices will
at least obviate the need for subjective selection practices that may operate
as a vehicle for intentional racism on the part of the employer.
The new testing standards, on the other hand, represent significant draw-
backs for equal employment opportunity law and Title VII enforcement.
One of the conceptual goals of both Title VII testing provisions and equal
employment opportunity principles is the elimination of those tests which
operate to exclude blacks from employment because of the present impact
of past segregation and racism' 04 and not because of the absence of job quali-
fications. Analysis of the nature of the changes made by the DOJ guidelines
reveals two arguable premises underlying the DOJ standards: first, a belief
that the adverse effects of past discrimination and segregation have dissipated
to the extent that a modification of equal employment opportunity remedies
is appropriate; or a determination that the business need for employment
testing devices outweighs the fair employment mandate for tests that are
strictly job-related for all test-takers. The DOJ guidelines' abandonment
of the concept and strictures of differential validity and the substitution of
moderately restrictive "fairness" standards10 5 undermines the best available
method by which illegally discriminatory tests may be uncovered and pro-
hibited. 100 In light of the consistently lower scores still registered by blacks
102. See generally Johnson, supra note 25, at 1257-62; Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 5.10 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 913-15 (5th Cir. 1973);
James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co., 394 F. Supp. 434, 498-99 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
103. See authorities cited note 25 supra.
104. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971); Blumrosen, supra
note 13, at 66-75. "Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the
education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their con-
trol, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for
the remainder of their lives." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806
(1973). See also note 97 supra.
105. For a discussion of differential validity and the approach of the EEOC and
DOJ guidelines to the subject, see notes 57-62, 90-96 & accompanying text supra.
106. Although this notion of differential validity is presently disputed, see note 59
supra, the dispute rests on strategy and practicality and not on principle or theory.
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on testing devices as compared to white test-takers, as well as the widespread
recognition that generations of segregation and racism have seriously ham-
pered black ability to grasp and master standardized testing devices, 107 the
premises of the DOJ guidelines are untenable. Moreover, these premises
ignore consistent congressional and judicial reaffirmance of the notion that
fair employment principles require accommodation of business needs, not
their ascendancy." 8 Whether the DOJ guidelines are a proper accommoda-
tion of business needs and equal employment opportunity principles is a
question that will be answered as tests are developed and validated in accord-
ance with the DOJ guidelines and as their racial impact is determined. It
would appear in theory, however, that the DOJ guidelines are an overreaction
to the failure of the EEOC guidelines to defer to the practical needs and pur-
poses of the employer.
If Congress and the courts require that tests with adverse racial impact
be reliable indicators of successful job performance in order to pass Title VII
muster, and if tests are to be "professionally developed" and not designed
or used to discriminate on account of race, then tests having adverse racial
impact should be differentially validated. This would reveal whether tests
are job-related for blacks and accordingly accurate measures of the true
qualifications necessary for the job. If tests are job-related and correlate
minority group ability with those skills and behaviors necessary for the job
and its successful performance, this is the best that can be achieved in an
imperfect world.'
Besides the differential validity concern, the policy of equal opportunity
in employment would seem to require that, if tests are to be used as employee
selection devices, they should be validated by studies that are as empirically
based and developed as possible. These tests should have the least drastic
107. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 103-07.
108. See Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 102-07 (1974); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in head-
winds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability . . ."); Wat-
kins v. Scott Paper.Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1181 n.30 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 163 (1976) ("the expense of [proving job-relatedness by job analysis and docu-
mented validation procedures] is a burden the employer must bear if it desires to use
tests that operate discriminatorily or perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.
See also notes 43, 97 & accompanying text supra.
109. Development and design of tests that are reliable indicators of black as well
as white job performance would best promote "culture fair" selection; however, such
tests have yet to be designed. Wilson, supra note 13, at 871-72. Another approach
would be to give blacks those tests valid for blacks, and to give white, culturally main-
stream applicants those tests valid for them.
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adverse racial impact among those evaluation devices that are reasonably
available to the test user in terms of expense, validation requirements, and
employment circumstances, keeping in mind the affirmative mandates of
equal employment opportunity law. The employer should be allowed to use
nonvalidated tests only after a substantial showing that a positive, good faith
search for validated tests or applicable validation techniques has failed to re-
veal any legitimate techniques or tests.110
The impact of the DOJ guidelines on Title VII itself would be less if the
EEOC guidelines were other than interpretative standards for that section of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.111 As such, the EEOC guidelines are not bind-
ing on the courts in Title VII litigation" 2 but are only entitled to appropriate
weight 13 insofar as they are reasonable interpretations and reflect necessary
interpretative expertise." 4  Because the DOJ guidelines are arguably the
more reasonable of the two sets of guidelines in terms of possibility of com-
pliance,' 1 5 it is highly possible that courts may switch their previous deference
from EEOC guidelines to those of the DOJ." 6 Indeed, one court has already
110. See Note, supra note 108, at 113-19.
111. The EEOC was expressly given only interpretative, not substantive, power of
administration. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 5, 12(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See
also note 14 supra.
112. See Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984, 988-90 (N.D. Cal.
1969).
113. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
114. Statutory and regulatory interpretations by agency administrators have been
given great deference in a variety of situations. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (interpretation of statute by HUD administrator);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (interpretation of regulation by Secretary of
Interior); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961) (interpretation
of regulations by AEC).
115. See notes 25, 98 & accompanying text supra. The problem of reasonableness
of the EEOC guidelines also arises out of their extensive stringency. Many commenta-
tors have argued that the EEOC guidelines go beyond the intent of Title VII in imposi-
tion of limitations and requirements for proper test use. See note 25 supra & authorities
cited therein. If courts agree with this criticism of the EEOC guidelines, they will
have an additional incentive to defer to the DOJ guidelines.
116. This switch of deference to the DOJ guidelines may arise in two situations.
The first is where both the EEOC guidelines and the DOJ guidelines are arguably
applicable to Title VII enforcement. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 6 (Supp. V
1975), provisions of which involve both the EEOC and the Department of Justice in
litigation of claims alleging violation of the testing provisions of Title VII. It is
in the court's discretion to choose between the guidelines. See note 32 supra. Second,
deference may be given to the DOJ guidelines over the EEOC guidelines in situations
where only the EEOC has jurisdiction that is, in the case of public and private employers
subject to Title VII other than the federal government. Because the DOJ guidelines
have been adopted by the Civil Service Commission in interpreting its Title VII responsi-
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done this in Title VII litigation involving a state instrumentality, freely rely-
ing on both EEOC and DOJ guidelines in its memorandum opinion, even to
the extent of applying DOJ standards to a differential validity issue.
117 If
other courts follow suit, the efficacy of the EEOC guidelines will be seriously
undermined even within their own jurisdictional pale.
IV. CONCLUSION
By failing to require separate validation studies for each racial or cultural
group of test-takers and by easing limitations on the use and validation of
testing devices, the DOJ guidelines run contrary to the policy and principles
of Title VII and equal opportunity law. While the EEOC guidelines are
overly strict and may well thwart the benefits of testing devices, they are at
least a positive attempt to establish the most valid tests for all groups of
test-takers. Fair employment law has been aimed at eliminating employ-
ment practices which operate to exclude blacks for racial or cultural reasons
rather than for insufficient job suitability. Restraints on employee selec-
tion procedures should be based or lifted only when the discriminatory fall-
out from past segregation and racism has ended. With the issuance of the
DOJ guidelines on employee selection procedures, it would seem that gov-
ernmental recognition of the cessation of the debilitating effects of segrega-
tion is at hand. Although the DOJ guidelines do not eliminate all restraints
on use of testing devices, their grant of wide impunity and discretion to
employers using tests having disproportionate racial impact signals a sig-
nificant reduction of emphasis on affirmative action and equal employment
opportunity mechanisms.
P. Michael Nugent, Jr.
bilities, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975), it is possible that courts may see both
the DOJ and the EEOC guidelines as interpretations of Title VII and may well defer
to the more practical DOJ provisions. Indeed, the DOJ guidelines claim all employers
subject to Title VII as subject to its standards. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 64, § 14(c).
117. United States v. Jefferson County, No. 75-P-0666-S (N.D. Ala., Jan. 10, 1977).
See note 33 supra. The DOJ guidelines are only applicable by the Civil Service Com-
mission to the federal government under Executive Order No. 11,478 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975), by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
to employers under Executive Order No. 11,246, and by the Department of Justice in
enforcing federal law. See notes 32 and 116 supra.
